INTRODUCTION
Freedom is central to most constitutions. In the constitutional context, freedom usually means both personal freedom and political freedom. Personal freedom can be described as the right to decide for oneself the terms of one's life, both individually and communally. It is what Frank Michelman calls self-rule: it "demands the people's determination for themselves of the norms that are to govern their social life". 3 Political freedom, on the other hand, implies the protection against arbitrary government power. This is what Michelman calls law-rule. In most constitutional dispensations both these types of freedom are implicated and the South African constitution is no exception. 4 But, it is ironic that in most constitutional democracies these two types of freedom are also frequently in conflict with one another. In fact, it is not far-fetched to suggest that they are conceptually contradictory. 1 My thanks to Paul du Plessis and Rena van den Bergh who read an earlier draft of this paper and made helpful comments. Any viewpoints and/or mistakes are my own. 2
Van der Walt AJ "Modernity, normality, and meaning: the struggle between progress and stability and the politics of interpretation" 2000 Stell LR 21-49, 226-243 243. 3
Michelman F "Law's republic" 1988 Yale LJ 1493-1537 1501. 4
Personal freedom is guaranteed by sections 9-16 and political freedom is guaranteed by sections 17-20 of the Constitution. But many sections guarantee both: see sections 31 and 32.
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Religious freedom is one of the sites where this conflict is often played out. Religion is one of the factors that influence the value-choices made in the process of self-rule.
Where these religious choices come into conflict with legislation, the question of priority becomes relevant. This paper deals with the ways in which the South African Constitutional Court has dealt with the question of religious freedom as an illustration of its basic underlying approach to the question of the conflict between self-rule and law-rule. For this purpose Michelman's analysis of the difference between the liberal pluralist and republican approaches will be used as basis. The purpose is not to provide a new theory of religious freedom or to prescribe new ways of dealing with this problem, but to give a critical perspective on current approaches.
The first part of this paper is a summary of Michelman's analysis and theory regarding the conflict that he regards as basic to American constitutionalism. The second part is a critical analysis of three constitutional court cases dealing with religious freedom.
The third part attempts to use the Michelman analysis to provide a different perspective on these cases.
LAW'S REPUBLIC
American constitutional jurisprudence is based on two premises regarding political freedom. On the one hand it is stated that freedom requires self-government and on the other hand that freedom requires government by laws and not by men.
5
Self-government or self-rule demands that people determine for themselves what values will govern their social lives. Law-rule demands protection against arbitrary power by prescribing general rules that must be obeyed. 6 In the case of self-rule a further distinction can be made between negative liberty (the absence of restraint) and positive liberty (that action be governed by reasons or laws one gives oneself).
7
Positive liberty requires citizenship, negative liberty does not. 
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It should be immediately apparent that self-rule and law-rule can be contradictory.
Without a doubt some value-choices will be in conflict with legal rules that law-rule requires one to obey. The question then is whether self-rule or law-rule will have priority.
Michelman explains how the contradiction is handled in American constitutional jurisprudence with reference to the decision in Bowers v Hardwick. 14 Law cannot be part of the battle, its legitimacy must rest on some "higher" authority.
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It seems clear that the question of the conflict between self-rule and law-rule deals with very fundamental issues. At its heart are the questions of the relationship between law and politics and of the nature of politics.
The problem with liberal pluralism
The attitude of the court in the Hardwick case can be regarded as typical of what Michelman calls pluralism 15 or, elsewhere, liberal pluralism. 16 As has already been stated, the pluralist rejection of the connection between law and politics is based on a specific view of democracy. This view is, in turn, based on a specific view of politics.
Pluralism, according to Michelman, is the view that it is impossible for people to communicate effectively and persuasively about values, because there are no common goals or ends.
17
If common goals do exist, they are simply the aggregate of individual goals that happen to coincide. Pluralist politics is therefore a market-like medium for maximising individual preference.
In such a scheme, common goods/ends are impossible.
Law, on the other hand, originates in the simultaneous acts of constituting and limiting the people as sovereign. For the law to serve the purpose of constituting a self-governing people, it must of course originate in politics. But if the law is also to effectively limit political will, it cannot remain grounded in politics. Law becomes "an autonomous force against politics, a force elaborated through its own nonpolitical modes of reason and its own nonpolitical, judicial organ". Once this objective basis is found, law can be severed from politics.
20
(T)he only form of discursive validation available for a constitution is the metaphysical-not-political appeal to rationality or natural law: that is, the appeal to that constitution just being, as a demonstrable matter of objective reason, the right constitution for a country such as ours is fated to be, populated by folks such as we by nature are. 21 It seems clear that the pluralist view is based on the individualist and objectivist paradigm of liberalism. Ironically the individualism in this approach did not lead to the expected outcome in the Hardwick case. That is because the severance of law and politics and the elevation of law above politics, makes the prioritisation of law-rule over self-rule inevitable.
Michelman's alternative
Michelman rejects the individualism of liberal pluralism. Republicans accept the notion of a common good that is more than the sum of individual interests. This is based on the "dialogic conception", namely that an individual is at least partly constituted by his/her social situation or context. 22 However, this is not communitarianism. The concern is still with the welfare of individuals, but never as if they are somehow separate from their social context.
23
Michelman also rejects what he calls classical republicanism.
This type of republicanism, for Michelman, is the defence of repressive and discriminatory laws whose only justification lies in majority views on morality. This morality is "Judeo-Christian" in nature and represents a commitment by the political community to this kind of morality based on its history.
24
Michelman accepts that this kind of "strong" communitarianism can lead to a very harsh repression of minority views and choices. 
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Michelman therefore rejects the "strong" communitarianism of classical republicanism in favour of a different view of politics. This view is based on the idea of politics that includes those traditionally excluded in order to enhance or renovate political communities. As such it involves "a kind of normative tinkering" -a re-vision and re-cognition of normative histories. 25 In republicanism the normative character of politics depends on the independence of mind and judgement, the authenticity of voice and, sometimes, on the plurality of views in debate. 26 Thus, republicanism recognises both the dependence of politics on social and economic conditions and the dependence of these conditions on the legal order. This explains the republican attachment to rights, especially rights to speech and property.
27
Rights are ultimately determinations of prevailing political will.
28
Republicanism is also committed to jurisgenerative politics. The only problem is that jurisgenerative politics depends on the existence of normative consensus that seems to deny plurality. 29 In reaction to pluralism, republicanism therefore rejects the market approach to politics and instead maintains that the political process can produce a normative doctrine that commands respect as law.
30
This political process is based on the idea of "an autonomous public interest independent of the sum of individual interests". 
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As a result, the conflict between self-rule and law-rule is less problematic. In fact self-rule and law-rule become basically the same thing. Law is based on politics and politics is the constant re-determination of the terms under which we live. Law-rule is therefore based on dialogic self-rule.
This approach does, however, translate into a problem regarding constitutional interpretation: how to remain true to the historical text and, at the same time, give voice to those excluded by that very historical text. This is only possible if courts are allowed to change the interpretation in a progressive direction. The traditional view is to see courts as agents of the constitutional past. The court's role is then benedictory, never prophetic.
34
According to this traditional view, the only alternative is "the nihilist menace".
35
Michelman illustrates the two possible approaches of the court by contrasting the Hardwick decision with the Brown decision.
36
(T)he Brown Court spoke in the accents of invention, not of convention; it spoke for the future, criticizing the past; it spoke for law, creating authority; it engaged in political argument. In Hardwick's case, the Court did the opposite. 106/173
According to Michelman, plurality in a society always implies indeterminacy. This indeterminacy is the precondition for critique and dialogue.
38
In the process of criticism and dialogue, the voices of "the other" are heard to take part in and/or disrupt the dialogue and this, Michelman argues, leads to political freedom through law.
39
A court engaged in republican practice will therefore challenge the self-enclosing and self-satisfied tendency of people to accept their own moral completion, as this will deny the plurality on which transformation depends.
40
The court's decision in Hardwick is therefore suspect in the republican sense. It denies homosexual participation in the public dialogue (a requirement for freedom) by reinforcing majoritarian ideas. It also denies freedom by privatising morality.
41
As a result, personal moral choice becomes a matter for criminal law and as such, it undermines freedom.
As Michelman states:
According to what I understand to be a republican ideal conception, politics is a field in which persons reciprocally exercise their capacities for changing and becoming by and through communicative relations. It is a dialogic process of persons overcoming, through confrontation with difference, the moral stasis and self-satisfaction of sameness. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S APPROACH

Never on a Sunday
In the case of S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 44 the Constitutional Court had its first chance to deal with religious freedom. In the court a quo the appellants were convicted of various offences in terms of the Liquor Act. 
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They did not deny the contraventions, but attacked the constitutionality of various sections of the Liquor Act. The allegation was that these sections were inconsistent with section 26 (right to economic activity) and section 14 (freedom of religion, belief and opinion) of the interim constitution. 46 All three appellants were convicted as charged and noted an appeal to the Constitutional Court.
In the Constitutional Court the majority dismissed all three appeals. O'Regan J, Goldstone J and Madala J dismissed the appeals of the first two appellants (based on freedom of economic activity), but upheld the third (based on freedom of religion).
Sachs J delivered a separate judgement, but concurred with the majority decision.
This discussion will only deal with that part of the judgement that deals with religious freedom and the emphasis will, for obvious reasons, be on the majority decision.
Regarding religious freedom the appellant argued that the purpose of prohibiting the selling of alcohol on so-called "closed days" 
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Chaskalson, writing for the majority, however distinguished that case from the present one on the basis that the Canadian Lord's Day Act had a "purely religious purpose and was designed to compel adherence to the Christian Sabbath" [90] . The Liquor Act, on the other hand, is "materially different in (its) scope and effect", and does not compel sabbatical adherence [90] . The court then points out that alcohol can be sold in closed days in a wide variety of places [90], but not under a grocer's wine licence.
The court states that it is aware that certain beliefs may be elevated through subtle means and that this can have the effect that "adherents of other religions may be made to feel that the state accords less value to their beliefs than it does to Christianity" [93] . But for various reasons the court does not feel that this is the case here. In the first place it is only the selling of alcohol that is prohibited [94] . In the second place, in South Africa "sundays have acquired a secular as well as a religious character" [95] . In fact, most people regard Sundays as a rest day, simply because it is convenient to do so.
Because of these two reasons, and because no evidence was placed before the court to indicate how the section interfered with religious freedom, the court found that "it is difficult to discern any coercion or constraint … (because) … the section does not compel licencees or any other person, directly or indirectly, to observe the Christian sabbath" [97] .
Legislation would contravene section 14 if the endorsement of a specific religion "has the effect of coercing people to observe the practices of a particular religion, or of placing constraints on them in relation to the observance of their own religion" [104] .
In this case, however, the connection between Christianity and the restriction on Sunday trading is "too tenuous" to establish an infringement on religious freedom 
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Sachs does not find the proportionality analysis any easier. He points out that religious conviction is based on faith, while public and private concerns are not and must be judged on reasonableness [33] . The implication seems to be that faith and reason are once again regarded as opposites. Religion can, therefore, not be judged on reasonableness. Although it is not denied that these are seriously held beliefs of the appellants [37] the court finds that:
Just as it is not unduly burdensome to oblige them to accommodate themselves as schools to secular norms regarding health and safety, payment of rates and taxes, planning permissions and fair labour practices, and just as they are obliged to respect national examination standards, so is it not unreasonable to expect them to make suitable adaptations to non-discriminatory laws that impact on their codes of discipline. The parents are not being obliged to make an absolute and strenuous choice between obeying a law of the land or following their conscience. They can do both simultaneously. What they are prevented from doing is to authorise teachers, acting in their name and on school premises, to fulfil what they regard as their conscientious and biblically-ordained responsibilities for the guidance of their children.
How bizarre is bizarre really?
The decision in Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape and others 
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The point is therefore that the state's ability to enforce the drug legislation weighs more heavily than the Rastafari's freedom of religion in this proportionality analysis [132, 139] . The interesting thing here is how this religion is set up to fail. If you use a test for religion that is anathema to the very religion you are describing [101] , then that very lack of compliance can be the basis for the failure to establish a formal control structure.
The It is not in dispute that Rastafari is a religion, nor is it in dispute that the appellant is a genuine follower of that faith, or that the use of cannabis is central to that faith.
[40]
He also points out that religion is a matter of faith and belief and what people believe may strike others as "bizarre, illogical and irrational" [42] . But in this case, the faithful are being forced to choose between following their religion or complying with the law.
Clearly, then, their freedom of religion is being infringed upon.
Nor does the minority believe that this limitation can be justified. South African society is diverse and the constitution recognises and protects this diversity. 
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Although the need to regulate the use of the drug is recognised, the minority argued that practical difficulties should not be allowed to determine the extent of religious freedom. Briefly stated, although the state's goal is a legitimate one, the means employed to achieve the goal is not reasonable. As a result the limitation cannot be justified.
Sachs J points out that the real difference between the two judgements "relates to how much trouble each feels it is appropriate to expect the state to go in order to 
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To safeguard the "right to be different" Sachs agrees with the judgement of Ngcobo.
Comment
In the very first case dealing with religious freedom, the Constitutional Court made it clear that there is an important difference between the South African and American constitutions in that the former does not include an "establishment clause" and that
American jurisprudence on this point is therefore not necessarily helpful.
57
However, further analysis shows that there are interesting similarities between the South African and American case law on this point. Sullivan, commenting on American case law,
shows that most cases dealing with religious freedom share a number of characteristics.
58
In the first place they typically deal with forms of oppression subtler than outright persecution. In the second place, most claims dealing with religious freedom are requests for exemption and not for invalidation. In the third place, these claims for exemption come from "members of relatively politically powerless groups, towards whom the majority is likely to be selectively indifferent or worse".
59
In the fourth place these cases work with a very narrow view of "coercion", based on "an overstated fear of religious anarchy".
60
It is not far-fetched to suggest that the three South African cases discussed above share the same characteristics. In none of the cases was it suggested that the legislation in question could be understood as outright persecution.
61
The claim was never that the Liquor Act, for instance, was a form of religious persecution. The claim is more subtle and dealt with what one may describe as the negative right to religious freedom. Just as there is a positive right to practice a specific religion, there is a negative right to practice none. As Sullivan puts it: "Just as Caesar may not command one to transgress God's will, he may not command one to obey it."
62
The problem with these subtle claims is that, too often, they are regarded as trifling. In some cases the court even suggests that the maxim of de minimis non curat lex should apply. 63 And this indicates a kind of selective seeing and hearing on the part of the court: 
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Not to see the (prohibition on Sunday trading) as sending a message of exclusion to Jews, Muslims or atheists is to see the world through Christian-tinted glasses. Majority practices are myopically seen by their own practitioners as uncontroversial
The fact that religious discrimination is seldom overt, results in the fact that most claims are for exemptions and not for invalidation. In South Africa that is also the case. Applicants in all cases requested an exemption to the various pieces of legislation and not that the legislation be invalidated. 65 Their claim is not that the laws themselves are discriminatory, but that the facially neutral laws have an impact on religion that is incompatible with religious freedom. The problem is that the absence of direct discrimination often blinds the courts to the effect and outcome of these supposedly neutral laws.
One of the most interesting aspects of these cases is the fact that none were brought by powerful mainstream religious groups. In the Sunday trading case, no religious group was in fact involved and this factor, coupled with the court's understanding of religious freedom as a positive right, explains the decision in that case. The other two cases were brought by relatively small religious groups. In the corporal punishment case, the appellant represented 196 independent schools with a total of 14 500 pupils.
In the context of South African education, that is a relatively small group. Even within the main group of Christianity, this is a fairly small group of people. 66 
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The importance of this factor cannot be overlooked. It has implications for the idea of politics as dialogue in republicanism. The problem seems to be that participation in the dialogue is premised on power -if the specific group is not powerful enough, its voice will not be heard in the conversation going on. In that sense, then, the "dialogic convention" requires power and must be conducted within the majoritarian Judeo-Christian form. Once again, the "politics of form" determines the debate. 68 The politics of form is also strongly premised on the court's view of coercion. In the What then is the view of politics that emerges from these judgements? In
Michelman's terms all three decisions privilege law-rule over self-rule. In every one of the cases, the exemption sought was denied because of some over-arching state purpose. This does not mean that any or all of the decisions are necessarily wrong, but merely that they illustrate something about the approach of the court. 
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More importantly, for current purposes, is the fact that the court in no way measures up to the republican ideal. Where republicanism seeks to include those traditionally excluded (the "other"), the court's reliance on traditional ideas of what constitutes religious freedom silences those voices. At no point, for instance, is the right not to believe ever acknowledged. In fact, the decision in the Sunday trading case suggests an impatience on the part of the court with what it views as "trifling" issues. But it is only trifling if viewed from a very specific angle and that angle tends to leave the self-enclosing and self-satisfied assumptions unchallenged. As such, the court fails to live up to the republican ideal.
But the decisions also expose a problem in republicanism, namely the close relationship between power and participation in the republican dialogue.
As
Michelman points out, politics depends on social and economic conditions which, in turn, depend on the legal order. However, for socially and economically powerless groups (like the Rastafari) participation in public dialogue might be a problem. Major religious groups seldom approach the court for exemptions, simply because they have enough political clout to have their needs met on the legislative level. It turns out then that power is a prerequisite for participation in the republican dialogue and that raises the old problem of the repression of minority views in classical republicanism.
If the courts are to be involved in "a kind of normative tinkering", and I have no doubt that they should, then claims based on religious freedom should receive a much stricter scrutiny when the appellants come from a small or marginalized religious group. I also have no doubt that the concept of religious freedom needs to be expanded so as to include the right not to believe. But that would require a court that is willing to abandon its benedictory role in favour of a prophetic role; a court that is willing to tinker with majority assumptions about stability and normality.
